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The present booklet puts together a few short contributions on the recent work by 
Stefano Zamagni and Luigino Bruni on the notion of civil economy. Among  recent 
works by historians (perhaps the best known is Robert Putnam’s work on the Italian 
civic tradition), economists and social scientists, the book here discussed deserves a 
special place for delving into the history of economic thought as a method of finding 
new ways and establishing new paradigms in economic theorizing. 
 
After an introductory exposé by the editor, the booklet hosts a comment by Gloria 
Vivenza (University of Verona) which traces some the Classical roots of the notion of 
civil economy. Thomas Hobbes notoriously changed the phrase homo homini deus, 
which is sometimes quoted from Caecilius Statius, into homo homini lupus.  The latter   
also, indeed, comes from Roman playwriters and is commonly attributed to Plautus.  
Today we have to go back to Statius’s sentence if we aim at an understanding of 
reciprocity, which is the core concept of this book.  Gloria Vivenza, as a scholar on the 
Greek and Roman background of Political Economy, is an excellent guide in the field.  
The subsequent comment by Roberto Scazzieri (University of Bologna, now visiting at 
the University of Cambridge) puts the notion of civil economy in context with some of 
main strands of economic thought in the 18
th century. In particular Scazzieri’s 
contribution highlights similarities and differences between the Italian civic tradition 
and the Scottish paradigm. Finally a young scholar from the Bocconi University, 
Francesco Boldizzoni, adds his remarks on the formative stages of the civic humanist 
paradigm in Italy and on the proliferation of the paradigm in Europe and, more 
particularly, in Britain. 
This booklet is closed by  ‘conclusions’  by the authors of the book. 
 
The comments given here were first presented at the 8
th annual Conference of ESHET, 
the European Society of the History of Economic Thought, held in Treviso 27-29 
February 2004. A special session of the Treviso Conference was organized by the editor 
the present booklet on the concept of  Economia civile. Thanks are due to the authors of 
the various comments for readily making their texts available for reproduction in this 
booklet. An obligation must be recorded also to dr. Elisa Portale, who has been helpful 
















  1ECONOMIA CIVILE 
AN INTRODUCTION TO BRUNI AND ZAMAGNI’S BOOK 
 





This volume is an ambitious assessment and an analysis of the implications of the line of research 
on the civic economy, which the authors have been pursuing for a long time. 
This is a book that is now just about to appear on the Italian market while an English translation 
will ensue in the course of the year.  The subtitle of the book – efficiency, equity, public happiness 
– tells about the ambitions of the project, which in fact is a contribution in social philosophy.  The 
work attempts to put forward a comprehensive justification of the notion of civic economy as an 
approach to economic analysis; at the same time it provides a presentation of the main results to a 
more general public.   Although some may perhaps find this odd or even impossible, I take in full 
the responsibility of prophesising that in both respects the volume promises to be an outstanding 
success.   The closely-knit prose tells a fascinating story.  It is not an easy book:  at the same time 
it is immensely attractive and the reader feels that one cannot leave it aside too lightly.  It is not a 
book in the history of economic thought, as the authors are themselves quick to point out (p. 9); 
but it deserves a place of honour in a history of thought conference because of the use it makes of 
the history of thought. It provides a case where the phrase political economy, so much used and 
abused especially today, takes its proper place; and in setting things right the history of thought is 
an essential resource and it provides key components of the main argument. 
 
Civic humanism flourishes.  Reciprocity. 
It is in this sense significant that the book  – after a brief overview explaining the principle of 
reciprocity, the true Prinzip Hoffnung, as it were, put forward in this essay – opens with a chapter 
on “The roots of the civic economy” which is a contribution to economic history and to the history 
of economic thought at the same time.  The authors provide a new reading on civic humanism.  
The special character of civic humanism as a typical product of the Italian context, through the 
Middle Ages and more particularly from the 11
th century, is “the profound unity between charitas 
and the economy, between gift and contract in those experiences near the rise of markets” (p. 32).
1    
                                                 
1   English translations of the text are mine throughout this Comment. 
  2Among the relevant examples, the montes pietatis  (the name is still in use today in Italy, monti di 
pietà) appear to embody the relevant symbiotic relation of solidarity and market with a principle of 
subsidiarity  (of horizontal subsidiarity, as we would say today) going with it.  The authors argue 
that the experience of civic humanism leaves a more profound trace in the Italian tradition where, 
for example, the phrase ‘civil economy’
2 becomes the hallmark of Antonio Genovesi’s system; a 
phrase that can certainly be read as the forerunner of the English term of ‘political economy’ only 
with important qualifications. 
 
The ‘freeze’ of the flourishing. 
In the sketchy reconstruction offered by the book – especially from latter half of the 15
th century  –   
after the flourishing of the civic culture, there is a sort of freeze.  “The Platonic spirit –   
individualistic, contemplative, solitary and exoteric – holds sway and closes de facto the season of 
the early humanism, social and Aristotelic”, the authors argue (50-51).  Moreover, the  spirit  of the 
civil economy had entailed directly and produced  an important breakthrough on happiness, 
conceived – following Aristotle – “as the fruit of civic virtues and therefore an immediately social 
fact” (54).  And it is in that context – its should be noted – that ingenuity and industry had made 
their appearance (p. 55; and cp. also 86, 87).   But, as just noted, what the freeze did  imply was to 
put a severe limit to the strength and power of the flourishing, if  not  bringing it altogether to a 
halt.  It is here that the way of conceiving civil society, that would later become dominant, takes 
shape through the work of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Mandeville.   Civil society here coincides with 
the State and the dichotomy of public vs. private becomes established.  But, of course, the Carsic 
River is still there and reveals itself through the importance assigned to public happiness, again in 
the Italian tradition of Muratori, Verri, Genovesi and others.  The science of  ‘bene vivere sociale’, 
of social good life, is the label which aptly describes political economy in Italy especially through 
the latter half of the 18
th century.  
 
 
The case of the Smithian paradigm. 
The relevance and the paradigmatic character of the Italian tradition is beyond dispute.  On the 
other hand, even if it is clear that in a necessarily sketchy reconstruction like this one we cannot 
find a treatment for all the major schools, the reader may still wonder what kind of place is 
reserved for the British tradition and its influence on modern economics. The case of Smith is 
treated in some detail in this book.  The authors – evidently encouraged by the flood of revisionist 
                                                 
2   I translate civile by ‘civic’, which seems to me better to reflect the English usage, except for the 
phrases ‘civil economy’, ‘civil society’, where in fact ‘civil’ sounds more appropriate. 
  3literature through the recent past – are willing to sympathize with him.  For Smith – the authors 
argue – “the market is ‘civil society’” (p. 91).  Smith is emphatically not a follower of 
Mandevillian cynicism.   His Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations must be 
examined together and compared with each other.  What emerges from the exercise is that 
similarities of the two works are the rule, to which of course there are exceptions.   Whenever the 
Wealth of Nations appears so keen to emphasize  self-interest and the like, this is because Smith 
wants to convey the idea that  the “existence of the market creates in any case the conditions for 
obtaining a certain degree of reciprocal assistance  even if love is absent  (though not thanks to the 
absence of love).  It enables us peacefully to obtain from others whatever is necessary to us, even 
if  not everyone around us is a friend of ours” (93).  The nature of  the human person is relational 
and here sympathy is interpreted as a piece of anthropology; on p. 95 the book in fact deals with  
“un’antropologia ‘simpatica’”.   
However, alas!, “of reciprocity, a central category of [Smith’s] moral theory, few traces survive in 
his economics”; at least not enough to prevent subsequent political economy from taking its 
peculiar twist and following the liberal capitalist perspective with which Smith would long be 
associated.   Hegel, Bentham, Wicksteed  are here the chosen heroes  illustrating these unfortunate 
developments.  Again, at the same time,  the Carsic River flows and that is signalled by Edgeworth 
and the Cambridge school;  by the latter phrase the thread is meant linking Malthus, through 
Marshall,  down  to J.M. Keynes.  As Bertrand Russell wrote in introducing his own History of 
Western Philosophy, of course any sketch of this kind offers ample scope for criticism especially 
on individuals or specific points.   What matters here, in my view, is that Bruni and Zamagni are 
rich of powerful and unconventional insights in  flying,  very rapidly indeed, over so much ground. 
 
 
The renaissance of the civil economy. 
From the above general setting the authors come to deal with the renaissance of the idea and 
design of a civil economy.  That kind of  renaissance is mainly the result of  unresolved problems 
gradually  developing from within the individualistic structure of economic theory, such as it 
happened to develop historically.  The  increasingly pervasive influence of Bentham’s philosophy 
on one side (117) together with the conceptual and  practical separation (122) of production and 
consumption on the other are the external forces driving to losing sight of  the market in the civil 
perspective described above under civic humanism.    In this sense, the alienation on the workplace 
and the obsession with opulent consumption at home  are the demons driving our contemporary 
  4dehumanised human person to complete madness.
3  The loss of all sense of community – meaning 
by that the whole domain of the institutions in-between market and state making the civil society – 
leads to our present predicament and false dilemmas.  The very description of  civil society, so 
common today, in ‘in-between’ terms is radically insufficient and misleading.   However, to set 
things right it is absolutely necessary, according to the teaching of this book,  to put the notion of 
reciprocity at the centre of the stage.  In  Bruni and Zamagni’s view this kind of ‘radicalism’ is a 
very rare commodity today; and, in particular, their criticism is directed to the current views on the 
so-called ‘third sector’ or  ‘nonprofit economy’.    The brief overview presented here (132 ff.) 
shows that these views are certainly not devoid of stimulating insights; at the same time they are 
weak precisely in that they accept a critically the ‘marginalization’ of the idea of reciprocity; and 
that  is in fact precisely the perverse result of  a whole course in intellectual history described in 
the book. 
 
Relational goods and reciprocity. 
It is here that the concept of reciprocity and the notion of relational goods
4 becomes essential.  The 
notion of reciprocity  (otherwise also indicated also as a gift principle) should not be seen as 
superseding the exchange of equivalents or the principles of equity or social justice through 
redistribution: reciprocity  should go along with the two other principles.   The authors make it 
clear that ‘relational goods’ –  the hallmark of  Martha Nussbaum’s neo-Aristotelian social 
philosophy   – are such that it is the interpersonal relation itself (271) that constitutes the 
commodity in question.   Therefore they are the result of a search for overcoming individualism 
and  promote socialization and their quantity depends on the exercise of reciprocity.  Reciprocity is 
the key to the full-realization of the human person; it is akin to gift and to the ideal of fraternity.  
Civil economy then is a system which accommodates the three principles, in particular including 
reciprocity, which had been obscured  by the advent of individualism and the quest for possession.  
In an intriguing passage, which seems somewhat at odds with the idea of the distinction of the 
three principles, the authors suggest the view that gift and contract (27) are not opposite; they both  
result from a more foundational principle which is the principle of reciprocity. Bruni and Zamagni 
have given contributions, along with other authors, to develop the idea of reciprocity;
5 what 
reciprocity implies is (166) “a series of bi-directional transactions, which are at the same time 
independent and connected among them” besides possessing the character of transitivity and thus 
normally implying a triadic scheme (ego-tu-alter).   This  view certainly attributes a strategic 
                                                 
3   See, for example, Z. Bauman 2001. 
4   On relational goods, see M.C. Nussbaum 2001.  
5  In particular  S. Kolm 1994, Sacco, P.L. and Zamagni S. 1997;  Bruni, L. and Sugden, R. 2000. 
  5flavour to the whole idea, which would thus seem to imply a return to the game-theoretical setting.   
The difference, however, though subtle, is extremely important.  For game theoretical reasoning is 
entirely confined to instrumental rationality and motivations are themselves mere instruments in 
the strategy of the game;  but reciprocity is not the result of instrumental rationality:  it reflects a 
search for efficacy  (rather than efficiency) and a natural taste and disposition for human 
flourishing.    Society  survives and improves if, and only if, the instinct of reciprocity, which is 
buried in the heart of every human being, is unearthed and made to work.  Irrational  ignorance and 
fear can prevent that from happening: here, however, rationality does not mean instrumental 
rationality, but the recognition of the real nature of the human being.  The ultimate aim of humans 
is the search for liberty.   Fear and lack of self-confidence can freeze the process of search and 




From the above ideas Bruni and Zamagni develop the argument in several, theoretical and applied 
directions.  We have already mentioned the implications for the ‘third sector’ and for the idea and 
economic justification  of voluntary actions.  Other major applications concern the welfare society 
in its contradictions leading to the present crisis, the labour market, the relation of production to 
consumption in modern societies, and so on and so forth.  What seems especially important in the 
present context is the general critique developed in this book  and the substantial demise of the 
(traditionally, instead, pervasive) influence of monetary incentives in economic life.  This has 
significant implications, which  affect, for example, the idea of happiness and the current 
paradoxes of happiness and the search for quality in working activities.   The market for CEOs is 
given as an example, indeed, not so much of the lack of influence of monetary incentives; the idea 
is, rather, that monetary incentives can certainly have, to say the least, perverse effects.  It is 
evident, in the authors’ view, that wherever our present society appears to thrive and carry fertile 
fruits this is so, not so much due to the possessive drift spurred by  liberal-capitalist motivations; 
that happens, to the contrary, in spite of those treacherous motivations.  For some reason it appears 
that, unnoticed and surreptitious, by some mysterious mechanism the positive and creative 
motivations to reciprocity are unleashed and work out their fine effects, which are then wrongly 
attributed to the invisible hand of the impersonal market.  Whenever  a motivational crisis occurs, 
it turns out to be easier to discover the trick.  It seems that we are fortunate enough nowadays to be 
witnessing a process of this kind and thus made able to discover a much richer concept of the 
market as civil society. 
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  7ECONOMIA CIVILE AND THE CLASSICAL CULTURE 






It is not of my competence to speak of the general thesis of this interesting book. As a historian, I 
may supplement some of its arguments; in the past, I had the opportunity of analysing topics like 
the relationship between justice and beneficence (or charity), the difference between gift-exchange 
and commodity-exchange, and even the concept of reciprocity, although in passing and only 
referred to ancient economy. In what follows, I only give some scattered remarks, organized around 
three main themes. There is no systematic discussion of the whole book, which is very stimulating 
and would deserve a more careful analysis. 
As I am interested in very remote times and doctrines I still perceive a sharp alternative between 
exchange on a contractual basis on the one hand, and a bilateral relation on the other which also 
involves an exchange, but different in character. My question could be: how can we move from 
private beneficence and/or state assistance to participation? The project illustrated in the book of a 
society where mercantile exchange (efficiency), redistribution (equity), and reciprocity (trust and 
liberty, pp.21-2) can coexist is a very good one and I hope it may be realized.  
My first problem is that the authors’ use of terms like “reciprocity” and “redistribution” is not 
exactly coincident with the concepts I know, being familiar as I am with ancient (economic) history. 
The anthropological theories of Karl Polanyi did oppose the two principles of reciprocity and 
redistribution to market exchange, so that I cannot avoid recalling them in this context, also because 
Polanyi aroused a certain interest on Aristotle as an “economist”. I am persuaded that he has a little 
forced the argument because he connected Aristotle’s reciprocity (=proportionate requital) to a 
concept of redistribution that the Greek philosopher could not have in his mind
6. 
Polanyian categories of reciprocity and redistribution have been applied to ancient economies, but 
they proved adequate only for preclassical palace economies, where they could be connected with 
institutional models of symmetrical or centralized relationships
7.  Collective organizations 
distributed economic activities and then “redistributed” the products (it was a state redistribution). 
Classical  (Greek and Roman) civilizations are difficult to analyse with this model because they 
                                                 
6 K.Polanyi 1965, p.93. Cf G.Vivenza 1999, p.148. 
7 L.Valensi 1974, 29:6, p. 1312-13. Cf also Finley’s observations about his own World of Odysseus in M.I.Finley 1975, 
p.116. 
  8were too developed, really, although they knew many transactions which were neither contractual 
nor beneficial/charitable. 
These anthropological studies have been connected with the preceding studies on “gift”, which 
starting from Marcel Mauss’ famous essay examined another kind of non-mercantile exchange. 
According to the explanation given by a classicist, the lack of an exact equivalence in this kind of 
exchange could even be an advantage: “An important aspect of reciprocal giving is the 
strengthening of relationships which are to be continued in future. It is therefore beneficial for both 
parties if an exact balance cannot be struck: a guarantee that the association will continue” 
8. 
But there is a kind of gift which cannot be reciprocated, that of the rich to the poor, or any kind of 
help which cannot be returned with a real equivalent. In this case, the weaker party must accept a 
subordinate position, in one way or another. 
Now, reading at p.27 of Bruni-Zamagni’s book that the principle of reciprocity is at the basis of 
both gift and contract, I feel that perhaps the concept is not exactly the same. That both gift and 
contract  concern human relationships, I cannot but agree; but I still see them as irreducible, if not 
alternative – I agree that in a society they must coexist and have both their place, but I think it is not 
so easy to shift the boundaries between them. (This shifting of the boundaries is a fashionable 
exercise, there is a book with this title; but my analytical head is not too happy with an operation 
which, however, I must acknowledge has provided in all times much reasoning and interesting 
results). 
The contract, besides being an exchange of equivalents, has other interesting characters: it implies 
that parties are on equal footing, and it is, so to speak, liberating, as Seneca had already understood: 
si reddidi, solutus sum ac liber: when I have paid, I am free (de benef. II, 18, 5): the relation is 
interrupted, broken off. He gives a negative sense to this, and the authors of the book would perhaps 
agree with him. 
But I would like to emphasize another side of the question. The non-contractual relationship gives 
rise to an exchange of non-equivalent things, or at least things which have no commensurability 
each in terms of the other. Genovesi’s distinction between mutuum and loan (p.42) which purports 
that interest cannot be exacted from a poor because this would transform  humanity into a 
commodity presupposes the existence of the poor and cannot do without them. The authors of the 
book solve the problem by implying, if I have rightly understood, that the two parties are 
complementary although unequal; but it is necessary for one of them to be willing (or obliged) to 
recognize itself as needy. At p.231 the weaker party is defined as a “bearer of need” (portatore di 
bisogni) and described as interacting with social and civil entrepreneurs; but it seems to me that the 
                                                 
8 P.Millett 1990, p. 184. Cf Bruni-Zamagni’s book, at pp. 176-7. 
  9main thing he has to offer is his own lower station. I quote again my beloved classics, Cicero saying 
that goodness and benevolence are the virtues of the praestans (in higher status, de nat deor. I,121); 
Seneca saying qui dat beneficia, deos imitatur (de benef. III, 15,4). There is a superiority in the 
person  who can help, and a corresponding inferiority in the helped party – I could also quote nice 
examples of people who did not like to stay there. This happens precisely in the personal 
relationship; and I think this is the reason why the help of the state is preferred.  
Lack of time prevented me from finding out a quotation which I remember: both parties, the needy 
and the helper prefer in modern society that the contribution passes through a neutral, impersonal 
institution (the state). It is someway funny that the character of impersonality belongs to the market 
and to the state also; and that it is considered  sometimes beneficial, sometimes not. Today, it seems 
that the principle is criticized on both sides: the market promotes the law of the strongest, the state 
wastes resources without reaching the goal. 
But I still feel that a certain degree of neutrality or impersonality is not so bad. Adam Smith wrote 
beautiful pages
9 on the fact that economic progress reduced human dependence (therefore enhanced 
human dignity). Today we are no longer in a logic of benefit/charity on the one hand, and 
gratitude/service on the other, but the needy person (the “portatore di bisogni”) has a sort of 
dependence – though it is excessive to represent him, as I did, in the light of the “somebody must do 
it”, or of being there to give others the satisfaction of helping him. 
But is it possible today to go back to the personal relation? This is the challenge of the book. I have 
really enjoyed the section on gift and reciprocity in the Middle Ages; and the phrase at p. 46 that 
prayers cannot be bought is beautiful and moving; but Todeschini quoted below says that the non-
commensurability of the goods helped to work out the distinction between gift and bargain - which 
is not eliminable, I think. There is a moment where the complex relations typical of the community 
(exchanges in the context of friendship, solidarity, etc.) begin to be perceived as ill defined. 
 
My second point is about a certain ambiguity between reciprocity and sociability, from a historical 
point of view. I mean that the actual difference between the two concepts is explained at p. 81 
(although it may be discussed whether social instinct  comes first, or vice-versa); at p. 59, however,  
there is a historical reconstruction which has puzzled me a little. 
The authors describe the individualistic turn of modern political thought, best identified with 
Hobbes’  homo homini lupus, which was contrary to theories (homo homini deus) emphasizing 
social instinct, as far as I know; but at p.59 these concepts are defined first “socialità”, then 
                                                 
9 I only refer to the most famous passage on the loss of power by the feudal lord in WN III.iv.12. 
  10“reciprocità”. Historically, however, it was the amor societatis, not reciprocity, which was opposed 
to Hobbes’ idea of a savage attitude in men. 
I am perplexed by the assertion that Aristotle would have guessed (or realized) the so-called 
“fragility” 
10of social life (or life in common). Certainly Aristotle says that there is no good life out 
of the polis, and that to be happy we need the others’ presence, but it does not follow that he sees a 
“fragility” in this. It is true that he says that man cannot usually suffice to himself, but he does not 
exclude the possibility, although in a paradoxical form: “the man who can stay alone is a beast, or a 
god” (Pol. 1253 a 29). Certainly this is the exception which confirms the rule, a rule further 
emphasized by the well known statement that the happy man should be self-sufficient, but this 
proves to be untrue because a lonely life is not good (E.N. 1169 b 3-11 and 17-19). Aristotle 
considers this human instinct to be so basic and strong that I am inclined to think that it is a 
strength, if anything. A problem of “fragility” may be recognized in the fact that man would find it 
difficult to survive if left alone
11, rather than in the uncertainty of the other’s response to our need 
of partnership (p.59). 
So, the argument that modernity, by accepting Hobbes’ theory (which however was opposed, I 
recall, with great resolution especially by the natural law thinkers) renounced the supposed fragility 
of life in common in favour of unrestrained individualism leaves me in doubt. I do not know 
whether sociability, or even reciprocity, is really more fragile than the homo homini lupus attitude. 
It could be maintained that the latter is more fragile because desperate measures
12 must be taken to 
find a remedy for it, while sociability is so strong that nobody even thought of opposing it: it would 
have been like opposing raining or sun. 
I must say, however, that I am not sure of having grasped the authors’ opinion as expressed at pp. 
59-60. The argument seems organized in terms if individualism (from Plato to Hobbes) opposed to 
sociability (from Aristotle to civic humanism). This opposition was widely debated and there is no 
need to dwell on it. But I am in doubt whether the authors meant to oppose reciprocity, instead of 
sociability, to Hobbes’ individualism. If this is the case, it is better to leave out Aristotle, because he 
is the acknowledged father of sociability, not of reciprocity. It is true that he also speaks briefly of 
the latter, but his theory of human aggregation, so to speak, is based on general social instinct. 
Aristotle’s reciprocity means proportionate requital and is firmly connected with the concept of 
justice in exchange, namely the antipeponthòs. It is obviously debated how to set it among the 
various kinds of symmetrical/asymmetrical exchanges and relationships, or the different types of 
                                                 
10 Certainly from M.Nussbaum’s well known book. 
11 “…for if each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts to 
their whole”, Pol. 1253 a 26-7 –by the way, this is the reason why Aristotle maintains that the state is prior by nature to 
the individual. 
12 Those described by Hobbes himself. 
  11justice, but it is usually connected with this kind of problems
13, rather than with relationships of 
philia, friendship
14 - although nobody can deny that friendship involves reciprocity, also in 
Aristotle’s description. But in the literature the term has somewhat “specialized” itself, so that it is 
impossible to mention Aristotle and reciprocity without connecting the concept with justice rather 
than friendship. 
 
The third point is about the conception of happiness, in its relationship with the Greek (Aristotelian) 
eudaimonia. In the book I find identification, perhaps a little hasty, of eudaimonia with flourishing 
(p.171), and again with reciprocity, because it is taken for granted that to flourish I need reciprocity. 
I’m afraid Aristotle did not say this: it is true that he maintained that man is not apt to stay alone; 
but his eudaimonia is not simply reducible to human relational nature. I cannot summarize this 
concept in a few words, but eudaimonia is activity (energeia) directed towards virtue and provided 
adequately with external goods. There is a bit of luck in it (eu-daimon), but the man must be able to 
exercise his faculties in conformity with virtue in every circumstance of life (E.N. 1100 b 18-22). 
The term “flourishing” was first used in John Cooper’s book (Reason and human good in Aristotle, 
1975), because he was not satisfied with the usual translation with “happiness”; I do not dare to say 
what of the two is better in a language which is not mine
15. But also Cooper’s interpretation of 
Aristotle is debatable, although I can understand that it may have an attraction on modern scholars 
who are more familiar with Rawl’s Theory of justice than with classical philosophy  (Cooper 
admitted that his interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of human good was influenced by Rawls’ 
theory of good – p.97 n.6). 
So, I conclude with a short hint at material goods, and economic (acquisitive) activity. Aristotle 
would have agreed with Amartya Sen (p.252) that wealth has an instrumental value, being not an 
end in itself; but I think he would not have accepted the idea that we must strive to get it. His 
reasoning begins when the problems of material life have already been solved, or at least he 
considers, and analyses, a man free from this worry - the exception being his model of exchange in 
N.E. and some “economic” suggestions in the Politics. But generally speaking, he says that men 
began to philosophize when they had provided to material needs (Met. 982 b 19-24); the eudaimon 
                                                 
13 For the sake of brevity I quote only K. Marc-Wogau 1967; T. Scaltsas 1995; L. Judson 1997; but the list ought to be 
much longer. 
14 One exception is D. Konstans 1998. 
15 I only quote Rackham’s observation ad E.N. 1095 a 20: “This translation (sc. happiness) of eudaimonia can hardly be 
avoided, but it would perhaps be more accurately rendered by “Wellbeing” or “Prosperity”; and it will be found that the 
writer does not interpret it as a state of feeling but as a kind of activity”. Cf also the observations in Terence Irwin’s 
edition of N.E. (1985, Glossary, pp.407-8, s.v.  happiness, eudaimonia). 
  12man must be (already) furnished with external goods, because “it is impossible to play a noble part 
without the necessary equipment” (E.N. 1099 a 32-33)
16. 
I understand that this may sound very strange, because Aristotle knew that wealth must have been 
obtained before being there; and he also knew that if one does not care for it, he will never become 
rich. But this was not a subject on which he wanted to dwell, if not in relation with political or 
ethical issues: and this he did, by admitting that wealth is necessary to well being and self-
sufficiency (which means liberty). But, as there must be a limit in all things (a limit which means 
perfection, by the way), the pursuit must be moderate and neither men nor cities must strive to have 
more than what is enough for them. 
The idea of running after wealth, even instrumental wealth, was not for Aristotle. It means a desire 
for wealth and a want to have more, therefore a lack or at least a shortage of it. If you lack 
something, you are not perfect. 
I know that all this has nothing to do with Bruni-Zamagni’s book. It is an effort to bring Aristotle 
nearer to his own thought, and his own time, too (I am an historian, after all). We are so obsessed 
today with an all-pervading economic perspective that it is not easy for us to understand a time 
when other things were considered worthy of that noble human activity of thought and knowledge. 
But it is not a fault of us, we cannot disregard the experience of so many centuries, which have 
witnessed all kind of vicissitudes that Aristotle could never have imagined – and also our idea of 
man has changed very much. 
And I still side with Quentin Skinner’s well-known assertion, that we cannot attribute to an author a 













                                                 
16 Civic humanism made the most of this, cf recently G.Griffiths 2003, pp.356-7. 
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  14THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: INTELLECTUAL 







1.  Introductory remarks 
Civil society is a relatively modern concept, which some authors date back to Leonardo Bruni’s 
translation of Aristotle’s Politics
17. Already in the second half of the 16
th century, the Flemish 
scholar Justus Lipsius gave a definition of life in a civil society that most economists would 
nowadays accept: ‘Vitam Civilem definio, quam in hominum societate mixti degimus, ad mutua 
commoda sive usum’ (my emphasis). (See also Ornaghi, 1984, p. 71.) In Lipsius’ definition, the 
political element of Aristotle’s conception recedes into the background, and civil society appears as 
a social arrangement in which exchange and division of labour introduce a basically horizontal (and 
open) network of economic interdependencies. As a result of a subtle intellectual twist, a Latin 
expression (subsequently translated into many modern European languages) was made to signify 
something quite different from the original Aristotelian source. A political concept, originally 
associated with notions of kinship and community, was translated into a non-political conception of 
sociability, which could encompass polity and government, but could by no means be reduced to 
them. The consideration of horizontal (that is, non-hierarchical) economic relationships is central to 
the intellectual twist described above. For it is through the objective interdependencies of economic 
life that hierarchy and command recede to the background, and sociability comes to be founded on 
a basis radically different from kinship and community. The ‘politeness’ of commercial society 
gradually emerges as a powerful intellectual paradigm, in which economic relationships of 
exchange and division of labour are located at the foundation of human sociability. In particular, 
exchange and division of labour are considered to be characteristic expressions of the human 
attitude to interact by means of reason and speech (see also Scazzieri, 1999; Porta and Scazzieri, 
2001, Rothschild, 2001). 
 
My aim in this comment is to highlight, albeit very briefly, some features of the above intellectual 
shift, which we may describe as a shift from civil life to civil society. This will suggest a review of 
                                                 
17 I am grateful to Gloria Vivenza for calling my attention to Bruni’s translation as ‘societas civilis’ of Aristotle’s 
‘koinonìa politikè’, which entailed a more direct reference to community and polity (see also Brazzini, 1988, pp. 130-1). 
  15the intellectual influences behind that shift. It will also suggest possible ways ahead for the 
economic theory of civil society. 
 
2.  Intellectual roots  
Civil society is closely associated with economic co-ordination not so much because of its 
connection with commercial society per se as for the central role of reason and speech in economic 
interactions. Writers such as Montesquieu, Ferguson, Smith and Verri explicitly considered this 
feature of civil society. We could argue that the point of view of these writers is rooted in the belief 
that an important anthropological discovery had been made. This was the idea that human 
rationality is essentially interactive, and that rational conclusions can be reached through a 
sophisticated interplay of reasoning and communication. 
This discovery is central to the anthropology of the Scottish Enlightenment. It is associated with 
multiple intellectual strands, which are briefly described below: 
 
(i)  The Aristotelian analysis of rationality in terms of prudent judgement under conditions 
of uncertain knowledge, combined with the Aristotelian view of sociability within 
‘natural’ associations (including the polis). 
(ii)  The Stoic and Christian tradition of cosmopolitanism and universal proximity. (A 
tradition clearly expressed in Cicero’s De Officiis). 
(iii)  The Medieval tradition of legal hermeneutics, with its emphasis upon the possibility of 
identifying ‘natural’ legal principles, and thus of extending the domain of law to 
previously uncharted territories (formation of the lex mercatoria, or ‘law merchant’, 
independently of sovereign authority). 
(iv)  The Humanistic view of active life (active procurement of riches) as a civic duty within 
the republican city-state. (This view is clearly expressed in some Florentine writers of 
the early Renaissance, such as Leonardo Bruni and Matteo Palmieri, but also features 
prominently in later Dutch writers, such as Jan de Witte, the Great Pensionary of the 
Republic of Holland,). 
(v)  The Platonic (and Neo-Platonic) tradition of the ‘light of nature’ within the human mind 
(Culverwell), and its developments in the theories of the moral sense (Shaftesbury, 
Butler, Hutcheson,) and of the impartial spectator (Smith). 
 
The above account is short and possibly not comprehensive. However, its principal aim is to 
show that the conception of civil society in its classical form (which we may associate with 
  16Smith) is a complex blend of multiple influences. The final product is multi-faceted and, to a 
certain extent, open-ended. This open-endedness could be seen as a great strength of that 
concept, as it suggests possible extensions into uncharted economic, social and geographical 
territories. 
 
3.  From civil society to civil economy: a suggested interpretation  
The recent contribution by Luigino Bruni and Stefano Zamagni is an important attempt to shift the 
intellectual horizon of economic theory away from the canonical model of self-interested rationality 
and competitive resource allocation. Their work is also characterised by close attention to 
intellectual sources in economic, moral and political philosophy. The connection between the 
Aristotelian theory of sociability and the Humanist tradition of active civic life is at the root of their 
conception of a civil economy. This approach is bound to emphasize certain features of civil 
society, while other features are not in the foreground. For example, Bruni and Zamagni (as argued 
above) examine in detail the Aristotelian tradition and the specific form that this tradition takes in 
late medieval and early Renaissance Italy (civic humanism and ‘vita civile’). The reason for this   
emphasis is that it is from this source that the concept of ‘civil economy’ takes its distinctive feature 
as a set of economic institutions (and organisations) associated with civic duties and the restrained 
practice of self-interest. 
However, it is precisely the above historical connection (with early Renaissance Italy, and perhaps 
also with late Renaissance Netherlands) that makes the paradigm of a civil economy close to but not 
identical with the Scottish paradigm of a commercial and civilised society. As a matter of fact, the 
Humanist paradigm of a civil economy shares features of Smith’s (or Ferguson’s) commercial 
society, but also includes features of the classical city-state (such as the role of kinship and social 
closure). The proximity of the Humanist republican model with these  features of the classical 
conception of sociability makes it difficult to use the pure model of a civil economy in the 
interpretation of economic interdependencies when the latter are introduced among ‘distant’ 
communities. The analysis of such interdependencies would almost certainly require a cosmopolitan 
model of the civil economy. We may conjecture that such a model would bring together elements of 
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  19CIVIL ECONOMY BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE:  






My first encounter with civil economy occurred while I was studying the foundations of monetary 
equilibrium in the thought of Bernardo Davanzati, the 16
th century author of the Discourse upon 
coins (Boldizzoni 2003). He perceived the equilibrium not indeed as the resultant of several 
strenghts, but as a condition of natural harmony which is established when the quantities of 
economic system are uniformly distributed, like a fluid, all over the civil body of republic. I easily 
identified his sources: from a formal (model-building) point of view, he had been inspired by 
medicine (Vesalius and the Paduan heritage); whereas at the level of contents he took his peculiar 
conception of human society (the umano consorzio) from the Latin classics, especially from Cicero:     
Est igitur [...] res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus 
quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis 
communione sociatus.
18 
My surprise grew when I realized the Italian Renaissance paradigm to be imported to England in the 
next century: Hobbes and W. Petty appropriated the juxtaposition between civil and natural body 
and the theory on the function of money as a measure of the flow of the goods and services 
produced by the economy during a given time period. Also Quesnay’s, Cantillon’s and the 
phisiocrats’ view of production as a circular process, was directly or indirectly influenced by 
Davanzati’s thought. 
The Classical School appears to us so far from this model not only because of the description of 
social and market interactions based upon the Newtonian mechanics, but because of its descent 
from what Bruni and Zamagni call the “notte del civile” as well.    
But did the 17
th century really mean an eclipse for the civil thought? Not entirely. This certainly 
happened in Northern Europe, where at the time of the Glorious Revolution the Reformation had 
already moulded the individualistic society with its originary mythology of the bellum omnium 
contra omnes, on the contrary the Mediterranean world stayed relatively immune to the process. 
Here the doctrines of Second Scholasticism (perhaps the best outcome of the Spanish Domination in 
                                                 
18 De republica, I, 25. 
  20Italy) show clear signs of the transition towards a Civil Enlightment. Such a missing ring in the 
historical reconstruction of our intellectual past still needs to be inquired into. 
An anonymous Milanese writer of the late 17
th century defined trust (fides) as the glue that holds the 
market together; moreover it addressed the “immutable reason of people” (Boldizzoni 2004, 
Appendix II). There is no trade-off between rationality and virtue: this is the independent answer 
that the catholic world gave to the problem of efficiency. 
Consequently we understand why in the 18
th century Italy the topic of happiness re-emerged so 
mightily. By then this context too appears to be dominated by the Newtonian analytic paradigm. 
Nevertheless, an almost identical use of social mathematics hides two antithetical conceptions of the 
world. 
Quel che la gravità è nella fisica, è il desiderio di guadagnare o sia di viver felice 
nell’uomo: e ciò posto tutte le leggi fisiche de’ corpi si possono perfettamente da chi sa 
meditarlo nel morale di nostra vita verificare (Galiani 1803 [1751], p. 91). 
Thus wrote Galiani, Smith’s great forerunner. 
La fede è ne’ corpi civili quel che è nei corpi naturali la forza di coesione […]; la 
reciproca amicizia degli uomini sia nel corpo politico, quel che è ne’ corpi naturali la 
scambievole attrazione de’ corpicelli componenti (Genovesi 1803 [1767], pp. 70; 86). 
Thus wrote Genovesi, the last of the ancients. He derided Mandeville, accusing him of being a 
naive social scientist: “who confuses happiness with the pursuit of self interest – he went on  – is 
just fool and ignorant of the human things” (ibid., p. 89). 
Otherwise from Democritus’ atoms, men appear to be conditioned by the background in a 
continuous give and take relationship inducing them, often unconsciously, to subordinate their 
choices to other people’s preferences. In many circumstances of life they act irrationally, in order 
both to cognitive limits, and to their obedience to the social norms that – above the subsistence level 
– have priority over any material expectation.   
The approach of civil economy has the merit to point out how happiness rather than utility deserves 
being the focus of an economic discourse which claims to be scientific, because happiness is the 
main determinant of human motivation. Such a general framework could explain both extreme 
behavioural typologies (the maximizing-hedonist’s one as the benefactor’s one), but relegating them 
to particular cases. 
Davanzati first considered income as a mere pre-requisite for self-realization; he turned his 
attention to the needs: 
  21All Men labour to become happy, and they think to find this Happiness in the Satisfaction 
of all their Wants and Desires [...]: all Men then do passionately covet all the Gold, to buy 
all things for the Satisfaction of all their Wants and Desires, and so to become happy.
19 
And observing how cupidity is at “the root of all evils”
20 in the economy, he gives us to understand 
that the eudaimonia resides in the temperance, in Aristotle’s medium. 
Is it really possible rethinking economics as “a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life [...] 
closely connected with the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of well being”? 
(Marshall 1948 [1920], p. 1). Bruni and Zamagni remove the problem of value neutrality at once, by 
the statement that science can be conceived as social engagement.  Nevertheless, I deem it possible 
to build a positive theory of civil economy too. Some of its assumptions seem to be first of all 
empirical truths: one could agree with them apart from his own ideological creed. Nowadays, 
however, the axioms included in the toolbox of mainstream economics are anything but neutral. 
Having made these preliminary statements, necessary, I believe, to conceptualise my point of view, 
I shall ask the authors of this book a question: have the external and internal reasons that once led to 
the achievement and consolidation of the neoclassical paradigm vanished? In other terms: after 
being awoken from its deep sleep, is 21

















                                                 
19 Davanzati 1804 [1588], p. 32 (translation by John Toland). 
20 Ibid., p. 39. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 





What the Civil Economy actually is? 
Perhaps at the conclusion of this rich forum dedicated to a book entitled “civil economy” few 
remarks about the key word of our research project can be worthwhile. 
There are at least three different, although complementary and deeply related, meanings of the 
expression Civil Economy, an expression pretty new in present-day theoretical debate in economics. 
 
1.  The first meaning that comes immediately to mind is a new and different historical 
reconstruction of the origins of modern economic tradition. In fact, if the history 
reconstructed in the book is plausible – and the various contributions of this forum seem to 
suggest it is – then the traditional way of telling the birth and the cultural origins of the 
modern economy and of economics have to be changed. To be sure, we have dealt almost 
exclusively with “economics”, but we consider important and absolutely central to our 
discourse some incursions into the “economy” dimension, such as our considerations on 
monachesimo, Montes pietatis, or civic humanism, interpretations inspired by outstanding 
historians such as Garin, Baron, Pocok and Skinner. As it is well known, the mainstream 
way of interpreting the modern economic tradition is built upon a substitution process: the 
principle of the exchange of equivalents (or instrumental market mechanisms) takes the 
place previously occupied by the principle of reciprocity, which was the basic pillar of the 
pre-modern social order. As a result, the anonymous and impersonal market “society” 
replaced the person-centered pre-modern “community”. Although this historical portrait 
embodies many real and unequivocal historical facts, in our book we claim that the process 
has been more complex and partially different. In a nutshell, we have offered some insights 
by showing that modern political economy, both in Scotland, and Naples and Milan, was 
essentially an offspring of the tradition of Civic Humanism of the Quattrocento, and 
therefore of the Greek and Christian humanism from which the humanists were influenced. 
As a consequence, Smith, the philosopher of moral sentiments, or Genovesi, the first 
  24academic to hold a chair in economics (1753), are not the “last of the pre-modern” thinkers 
(as normally depicted), but representatives of an old tradition, that continued after them 
within modernity. It follows that our book is, in a sense, also a “map” of an underground 
river (fiume carsico). 
 
2.  A second meaning of the expression “Civil Economy” emphasises the adjective “civil”. 
Civil comes from the Latin civitas, that is the translation of the Greek polis. The concept of 
civicness or civil (civic) virtues is in fact another key category of the book. More precisely, 
civil virtues are, since Aristotle (at least in Western culture), the preconditions for happiness. 
In this perspective there is no true happiness outside the polis: happiness is by its nature 
civil; happiness cannot be but “public happiness”, pubblica felicità. In the central part of the 
book we endeavour to show why, from Bentham onwards, the classic concept of happiness 
as “eudaimonia” has been reduced to utility. This reductionistic move is, according to our 
reading, the most serious impoverishment of contemporary economics. In fact, to define 
economics as the “science of utility” has deprived economists of the categories of though for 
properly tackling social interactions, relationality, reciprocity, phenomena that cannot be 
ignored even by mainstream economic analysis. Our happiness is constitutionally a 
“relational”entity, being so deeply connected to that of the others, as the Japanese poet Kenji 
Miyazawa (1896-1933) used to say: “happiness in the true sense is impossible for the 
individual to attain unless he seeks the happiness of the others”. Also in Western tradition 
happiness has been conceived as a matter of relationships between people, depending on 
“relational goods”, goods made also of relations. Utility, instead, is the property of the   
“relation between a man and a thing”, as Pareto used to say. The perspective of civil 
economy is very much interested in underlining the “paradoxes of happiness in economics”, 
because it re-directs the attention of economic discourse to a sort of “transformation 
problem” that has always been disregarded so far: whether and how commodities get 
transformed into personal well-being. As we document in the book, such an issue has always 
been extremely important in the tradition of civil economy. 
As we show in the book, the notion of homo oeconomicus has to do with the idea of desert, 
i.e. with the idea of a human being in its insurmountable solitude. Homo oeconomicus is an 
autistic being. Agents cross one another in the market place to sign up contracts and to do 
business, but they never really meet in order to recognize one another. Solitude is a state of 
separation not only from the other, but also from the self. Thus, it should come to no 
  25surprise to discover that, as long as we remain within the realm of traditional economics, it 
is practically impossible to talk about happiness in a proper and meaningful way. 
 
 
3.  A third meaning of Civil Economy is related to the current debate on the growing 
importance in our societies of the so-called third or nonprofit sector. Perhaps, it can be 
claimed that the most important ambition of the book is to offer a general theoretical 
framework for properly understanding what is going on today in this alive and stimulating 
area of research. To interpret social or nonprofit economy as civil economy cannot be 
considered just a question of wording: it is, instead, a question of giving cultural and 
theoretical dignity to a phenomenon that is growing of importance. For two reasons. First, 
contemporary economic theory considers these forms of economic activity as something 
marginal, esoteric or even bizarre. They are considered as an “exception” to the general rule 
of the economic activity, the for-profit sector. We consider this way of distinguishing 
economic activity based on the profit motive  (for-profit/non-profit) as misleading, since 
economic agency, goods and firms are much more complex human and social matters as 
usually depicted. Second, the nonprofit sector itself  tends to conceive its own activity as 
“social”, and as such different from the “usual” economy based on the principles of self-
interest and profit maximisation. Such a dualistic or Manichean stance is no less misleading. 
It is hard to die, being deep-rooted in particular in the European social economy tradition. 
To look at the economic activity from the civil economy perspective bring us to a different 
conclusion: the physiology, the normal functioning, the vocation of the market is to 
represent a moment of civil life. Of course, economy can become, and historically has often 
become, an “uncivil” activity, but this is the pathology, mainly due to the fact that market, 
for various and very well known reasons, at a certain point in time started to sever itself 
from the civic humanistic principles. In a sense, the main ambition of the book is to reverse 
the relation between the “rule” and the “exception”.  
 
4.   The reductionist route taken by economics, from the second half of the 19° century onwards 
has ended up by disarming critical thinking, with the results we have outlined in the book. 
For this the profession must accept its own responsibilities. For too long, generations of 
pupils have been led to believe that scientific rigor postulated an ascetic stance; that in order 
to be scientific, research had to free itself from any reference to values. We have now the 
result: ontological individualism - that is itself, a value judgment, and a very strong one, 
  26indeed - has acquired the status of a "natural" assumption, that as such does not require any 
justification. It sets itself up as a benchmark that every other hypothesis on human nature 
"has to" measure itself against. Indeed, only to individualism is granted the privilege of 
naturalness in traditional economics. 
We don't think we can continue along this path for long. A choice has to be made: either we 
remain anchored to non-tuism and are prepared to pay the price of not being able to offer an 
answer to the naive, but fundamentally true, observation of Saint-Exupèry: "Men… buy 
things all ready made at the shops. But there is no shop anywhere where one can buy 
friendship; and so men have no friends anymore" (Little Prince). Or we accept to give up 
non-tuism and then we might be able to articulate all the consequences of the (unnoticed) 
intuition of Gossen when he wrote: "most pleasures become actual pleasures only if other 
persons, too, participate in the enjoyment". 
Abell has written: "The theory of rational action is the necessary point of departure with 
which to compare other kinds of theory" (1992, p.186). Statements of this kind are far from 
being neutral and innocent, as one might be led to believe. The fact is that precisely through 
this kind of statement, uncritically repeated an infinite number of times, the theory of 
rational choice has ended up by acquiring an actual "paradigmatic privilege": every other 
explanation of the agents' behavior has to "reckon" with that point of departure. Thus, for 
example, while one is forced to explain why someone makes a gift, non-tuistic behavior is 
considered completely natural, not needing any explanation. Why should one feel exempted 
from providing valid reasons for not donating, whereas the opposite is not the case?  
Needless to say, any attempt to restore within economic discourse the civil perspective is 
sure to be well received, at least not opposed, by the profession, provided one can prove that 
such retrieval, while taking place in full compliance with the canons of scientific practice, 
will be of help in correcting some aporias and filling gaps in the discipline.  In other words, 
one needs to be able to prove that the introduction of civil economy categories into the 
developing process of economic thinking can widen, not restrict, the cognitive range of 
economic science, thus enabling it to firm up its grip on reality. Our point is that the most 
significant contribution that such an attempt can nowadays offer for a reconceptualization of 
economic discourse lies in its capability to answer the following question: is it possible to 
humanize the market, that is, is it possible to figure out a model of market capable of 
tentatively including all human beings and of estimating all of the human person in his/her 
multifaceted dimensions?  It seems to us that   the central problem in the current transition 
towards a  post-Fordist society is to understand how to fare so that individuals may be at 
  27liberty to decide the procedures for the supply of the goods they demand.  What is at stake 
here is not so much freedom to decide the overall composition of goods to be produced 
(more of private versus more of public goods; more merit versus more relational goods), but 
freedom to decide how that composition should be achieved.  This is why one cannot 
advocate the efficiency principle in order to decide what and how to produce.   
Undiscriminating admirers of the market as a social institution seem to overlook the fact that 
it is the very hegemonic expansion of those relations that we call private economy, that will 
slowly but inexorably destroy the whole system of social norms and conventions which 
constitute a civil economy, thereby paving the way for the success of new forms of statism.  
Today it is urgent to admit that the hypertrophic growth of both State and private market is a 
major explanation of the many problems that embarrass our societies.  Such being the 
situation, the solution cannot be found in the radicalisation of the public economy versus  
private economy alternative, or neo-statism versus neo-liberalism, but in a healthy 
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